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I. INTRODUCTION
In contemporary Europe, the Court of Justice of the European
Union (“ECJ”) functions as a uniquely authoritative international
court. Its key doctrines—direct effect and supremacy—ensure a
relatively effective enforcement of European legislation compared to
standard international organizations. Likewise, the system of
* This article is based on a lecture given in November 2012 at The American
University Washington College of Law, Washington, DC. I would like to thank
Bill Davies and Fernanda Nicola for organizing the event and giving me the
chance to present the new historical research on European public law. I would also
like to take the opportunity to thank the two commentators at the event, Mark
Pollack and Francesca Bignami, as well as Fernanda Nicola, Bill Davies, and
Michelle Egan for all the insightful comments that helped sharpen this article.
** Saxo Institute, History Section, University of Copenhagen.
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preliminary references sent from national courts to the ECJ has given
voice to private litigants across Europe to pursue the rights given
them by the European treaties and legislation. In fact, the ECJ has
today become so central in the EU that sympathetic academic
observers claim it has become a European Supreme Court of sorts
and that it has built a constitutional, proto-federal legal order.1 How
did this happen? How could a set of international treaties—the
Treaties of Rome (1957)—albeit of a somewhat unusual nature,
gradually attain the status of a constitution or at least lead to what
might be termed a “constitutional practice”?2
This has been the key question of a new emerging field of legal
history focusing on the foundation and development of European
public law. Drawing on new evidence from available private, state,
and European archives, the new historical research goes behind the
scenes to unveil the world in which European public law was
created. The result is a more complex and deeper understanding of
the social, institutional, legal, and ideological roots of European
1. See ROBERT LECOURT, L’EUROPE DES JUGES (1976) (asserting ECJ is a
higher court penetrating the rule of everyday life of member states); Olivier
Audéoud, L’acquis Communautaire, du “Mythe” á la Pratique, 33 REVUE
D’ÉTUDES COMPARATIVES EST-OUEST 67 (2002); G. Frederico Mancini, The
Making of a Constitutional Europe, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 595 (1989)
(proposing that the EJC has created a federal-type structure in Europe). See
generally JOSEPH WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW
CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?” AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
(1999); Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational
Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1981).
2. See generally Stein, supra note 1 (supporting the notion that the
“constitutional practice” concept is preferred to the standard mainstream concept
of “constitutionalization” because the latter implies that the ECJ successfully
transformed the Treaties of Rome into a sort of proto-federal European
constitution). I do not dispute that the ECJ has tried to achieve this objective, but
by employing the concept “constitutional practice” instead, we avoid any
premature assumptions about the nature of the outcome. See generally JOHN ERIK
FOSSUM & AGUSTÍN JOSÉ MENÉNDEZ, THE CONSTITUTION’S GIFT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY FOR A DEMOCRATIC EUROPEAN UNION (2001)
(providing an interesting attempt to conceptualize alternative processes of
“constitutionalization” based on a comparative historical approach). This article
will argue that the constitutional practice of the European institutions—in partial
agreement with Fossum and Menéndez—has not decisively put the EU on the path
of constitutionalization. See Part VI for a fuller discussion on this point. See Treaty
of Rome, Apr. 24, 1958, 294 U.N.T.S. 4300 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]
(establishing the European Economic Community, which later became the
European Union).
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public law.3 This article will discuss the results of this new field of
research and how it contributes to the overall understanding of the
development and nature of European public law. This will be done in
three steps. First, Part II shall take a brief look at the legal and social
sciences research on the European public law in a historical
perspective. Second, Parts III, IV, and V shall go through three
particular dimensions to which the new historical literature
contributes. Finally, Part VI shall discuss to what extent the new
historical literature offers a revisionist account to the mainstream
understanding of the history of European public law in law and the
social sciences.

II. EXPLAINING EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW—
A BRIEF HISTORY
OF AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FIELD
Today, the field of EU legal studies is a particularly varied and
deeply interdisciplinary subfield of broader European studies.
However, until the late 1970s, the major contributions to the analysis
of European public law came mainly from jurists, both academic and
professional.4 In the aftermath of the key ECJ judgments of Van
Gend en Loos (1963) and Costa v. E.N.E.L. (1964), which introduced
direct effect and primacy of European law, a separate field of EU
legal academia emerged.5 The main occupation of legal writers in the
3. See generally BILL DAVIES, RESISTING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE:
WEST GERMANY’S CONFRONTATION WITH EUROPEAN LAW, 1949-1979 ix (2012)
(noting that most scholars have failed to examine the process of legal integration in
the European Union in the historical context of the time in which integration was
occurring); Morten Rasmussen, Constructing and Deconstructing ‘Constitutional’
European Law: Some Reflections on How to Study the History of European Law,
in EUROPE: THE NEW LEGAL REALISM 639 (Henning Koch et al. eds., 2010)
[hereinafter Rasmussen, Constructing and Deconstructing ‘Constitutional’
European Law] (providing an overview of the history of European “constitutional”
law); 21 CONT. EUR. HIST. (Special Issue No. 3) (2012) (containing publications
concerning European public law); 14 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. (2008)
(containing key publications relating to the study of European public law).
4. See Harm Schepel & Rein Wesseling, The Legal Community: Judges,
Lawyers, Officials and Clerks in the Writing of Europe, 3 EUR. L.J. 165, 171–76
(1997) (stressing that European legal doctrine is written by an unusually high
percentage of staff from administrative and judicial institutions compared to
writers of national public law and national economic law journals).
5. See Case C-6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 587 (establishing
supremacy of European law over the laws of the individual member states); Case
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first decades was doctrinal commentary employing what could be
characterized as an apolitical reading of the development of
European public law.6 According to this scholarship, the ECJ had
simply applied the rules of the Treaties of Rome in a systematic,
legally authoritative manner. If certain judgments were considered
controversial by governments or the general public, this was by no
means evidence of court activism; rather, it was an expression of the
wavering political will of the member states to fulfill the obligations
of the treaties they had ratified.7 The high quality of ECJ case law, it
was argued, also constituted a key factor behind what, in this
literature, was argued to be the gradual acceptance by national
judiciaries of European public law doctrines and practices.8 In fact,
the process of developing European public law was mainly one of
legal argument and persuasion. While various discussions about the
nature of European public law, particularly in the 1950s and early
1960s, touched upon whether it was merely a subset of international
law or alternatively of a constitutional nature,9 from the mid-1960s
onwards, ECJ judges were generally keen to sidestep such politically
fraught debates and maintain a formalist position.10
C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1
(establishing that certain provisions of the EEC Treaty create individual rights that
must be protected by national courts).
6. See Martin Shapiro, Comparative Law and Comparative Politics, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 537, 538 (1980) (offering the classic description of this supposedly
apolitical EU law field).
7. Cf. id. at 541–42 (asserting that the goal was to move toward European
internationalism but, in reality, a “growing complexity and diversity of political
loyalties” has manifested).
8. See id. at 538 (describing the idealistic view of European case law as
simply discovering the true interpretation of European law).
9. See, e.g., 6 ACTES OFFICIELS DU CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL D’ÉTUDES SUR
LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L’ACIER (A. Giuffrè ed.,
1958); Gerhard Bebr, The Relation of the European Coal and Steel Community
Law to the Law of the Member States: A Peculiar Legal Symbiosis, 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 767 (1958) (discussing the conflicts between member state constitutions and
the treaty, but not referring to the treaty itself as a sort of constitution); Pierre
Pescatore, Rapport General, in ZEHN JAHRE RECHTSPRECHUNG DES
GERICHTSHOFS DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN 520, 520 (1963)
(representing interesting examples of discussions concerning the nature of
European public law in the early period).
10. See, e.g., André M. Donner, The Constitutional Powers of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities, 11 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 128 (1974)
(arguing that, in using these documents, judges are “exercising a substantial
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From the late 1970s, legal scholarship was fundamentally
transformed and moved away from the original apolitical reading.
Two scholars—the most prominent American-based expert, Eric
Stein from Ann Arbor, and a young Joseph H. H. Weiler, then a
Ph.D. candidate from the European University Institute in
Florence—formulated, at first independently, and later to some
extent in mutual inspiration, what would in a decade develop into the
new scientific paradigm.11 While pursuing different arguments, they
agreed that the ECJ had made an active choice in favor of
integration. By interpreting the Treaties of Rome as if they amounted
to a constitution, the ECJ had built a proto-federal legal order; to use
Stein’s famous conceptualization, the ECJ “constitutionalized” the
treaties.12 Stein added—based on his intimate personal contacts in the
European institutions—that the Commission’s Legal Service had
played a key role in promoting and legitimating this choice.13
Weiler’s original contribution was to put the development of
European public law in a comparative perspective with the political
dimension of the integration process. He argued that when the ECJ
strengthened enforcement in the legal sphere, a parallel—if not
necessarily causally linked—strengthening happened of national
executive power due to the introduction of the veto right in 1966.14
constitutional power” but are not at all “legislating nor constitution-making”);
Pierre Pescatore, Rôle et Chance du Droit et des Juges dans La Construction
d’Europe, 26 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 5 (1974) (discussing
the formation of European public law through a stable constitution, treaties,
legislative power, and communal judicial power).
11. See generally Anne Boerger-De Smedt & Morten Rasmussen, Legitimizing
the European Court of Justice? The History of the Constitutionalisation Paradigm,
1950-1992 (Dec. 2011) (unpublished conference paper, University of Copenhagen)
(describing the process of Stein and Weiler’s development of their constitutionmaking theory).
12. See Stein, supra note 1, at 24–25 (stating that the “court has been led by the
Commission in the inexorable progression toward more legal integration”).
13. See ERIC STEIN, THOUGHTS FROM A BRIDGE: A RETROSPECTIVE OF
WRITINGS ON NEW EUROPE AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM 472 (2000) (recounting
how instrumental Michel Gaudet, the first Director General of the Legal Service of
the European Commission, was to his witnessing the preliminary efforts of the
service in the Van Gend and Loos case); Stein, supra note 1, at 24–25 (explaining
how the Commission’s Legal Service developed an argument that allowed the
Commission to deal with the treaty as a constitution).
14. See JOSEPH WEILER, SUPRANATIONAL LAW AND THE SUPRANATIONAL
SYSTEM: LEGAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY (1982); Joseph Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character

1192

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[28:5

The introduction of the national veto right over new policy
development meant that national governments could tolerate the
hardening of the enforcement of the legal order. What motivated
national courts to do so—beyond the assumption that they were
convinced by the ECJ’s legal argument due to the strength of
formalism among European judiciaries—was the enhancement of
court power in general that cooperation with the ECJ spurred. The
renewed dynamic of the EC connected with the adoption of the
Single European Act (1986), which reformed the legislative system
by introducing majority voting in the Council and threatened to break
the balance on which the “constitutional practice” had rested.15
However, by 1994 Weiler concluded that the constitutional project
had not only survived but succeeded and that the member states,
including national courts, had accepted the “quiet revolution.”
Inspired by the new dynamics of European integration and the end
of the Cold War in 1989, a new generation of American political
scientists were ready to embark on studies of legal integration, which
had until then generally been overlooked in most political science
studies of European integration and which seemingly had been so
successful.16 Young scholars such as Alec Stone Sweet, Karen Alter,
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Geoffrey Garret, and Daniel Kelemen began
to study European public law, write doctoral dissertations, and
publish important articles and monographs in the 1990s and early

of Supranationalism, in YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW I 267, 268 (F.G. Jacobs
ed., 1981) (examining the development of the interplay between the constituent
States of the European Community and the Community’s supranational organs);
Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2428–29
(1990) (suggesting that, without the veto power, the member states may not have
agreed with the “constitutionalization” that the ECJ was implementing).
15. Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403 (1991);
Joseph Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism,
1 Y.B. EUR. L. 267–306 (1981); Joseph Weiler, Supranational Law and the
Supranational System: Legal Structure and Political Process in the European
Community (1982) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, European University Institute).
16. But see Ernst B. Haas, Foreword to STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE LAW IN
POLITICAL INTEGRATION: THE EVOLUTION AND INTEGRATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF
REGIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1971) (noting that,
rather than increasing compliance on the national level, European regional law has
given national executives more flexibility); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE RULE OF
LAW IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE PATH OF THE SCHUMAN PLAN (1965)
(containing a discussion of European integration).

2013]

REWRITING THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW

1193

2000s.17 At first this new generation of American political scientists
repeated the traditional—and less than fruitful—American debate of
whether realism or neofunctionalism best explained the development
of European public law.18 However, after meeting people like Weiler
and ECJ Judge Federico Mancini, who trumpeted the achievements
of the new European rule of law,19 these scholars began to work
within the confines of the constitutional paradigm, exploring the
various dimensions that needed to be fleshed out. The originality of
this new political science literature on European public law came
from the fact that these young political scientists brought their
discipline’s conceptual and theoretical tools and analyzed the ECJ as
a “normal” institutional and political actor.20 From this approach
emerged an acute sensibility of how the ECJ had managed to
empower both itself and the other supranational institutions through
its case law, which deepened the insights already brought forth by
17. See, e.g., KAREN ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN
LAW: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE (2001)
[hereinafter ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW]
(explaining national support for European law and its effects on European
politics); R. DANIEL KELEMEN, THE RULES OF FEDERALISM: INSTITUTIONS AND
REGULATORY POLITICS (2004) (taking the position that “the development of EU
regulatory policy can best be understood by viewing the EU as a federal system”);
ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN
EUROPE (2000) (explaining the foundational changes that occurred in governance
that proceeded from the establishment of enforceable constitutions in Europe).
18. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A
Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41 (1993) (arguing “that the
legal integration of the community corresponds remarkably closely to the original
neofunctionalist model . . .”); Geoffrey Garrett, The Politics of Legal Integration in
the European Union, 49 INT’L ORG. 171, 171–72 (1995) (discussing the
development of the EU and analyzing behavior of the national governments and
the Court of Justice in order to develop a theory of legal integration); Geoffrey
Garrett et al., The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal
Integration in the European Union, 52 INT’L ORG. 149, 175 (1998) (suggesting
that debating labels, such as “neofunctionalism” and “intergovernmentalism,” is
unproductive “with respect to scholarship on European integration”).
19. See Karen J. Alter, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice:
An American Perspective, in EUROPE: THE NEW LEGAL REALISM, supra note 3, at
1, 1–2 (recounting the influence Judge Frederico Mancini had in increasing the
author's interest in the ECJ); Mancini, supra note 1 (discussing the achievements
of the ECJ in “constitutionalizing” the treaty).
20. Cf. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, supra note
17, at 5–8 (noting that the role of the ECJ in the European political process has
changed as the European legal system has developed).
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Weiler and Stein.21 In addition, two alternative explanations of how
the constitutional practice had become accepted by national
judiciaries and governments emerged.22
In a string of publications, Alec Stone Sweet argued that EC trade
liberalization gave rise to private litigation through the mechanism of
preliminary references from national courts to the ECJ, which in turn
resulted in case law that furthered the building of a strong legal order
and furthered trade liberalization.23 A virtual circle of legal
integration was created beyond the reach of the member states’
governments.24 Karen Alter alternatively argued that the reception
process of ECJ case law was more contentious in the member states
than hitherto assumed.25 Studying the cases of France and Germany,
she found widespread resistance among national judiciaries to the
constitutional practice. The exact shape of European public law was
consequently a negotiated compromise between the ECJ and national
courts. The constitutional practice was eventually accepted because
lower national courts for reasons of self-empowerment helped
promote European doctrines by the means of the preliminary
reference mechanism, but also because the dynamics of European
integration in the 1980s forced the last resistance in national high
21. See id. at 1 (arguing that the ECJ took its new rule-making authority to
ensure that member states “respect their European legal obligations”).
22. See generally THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS —
DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT (AnneMarie Slaughter et al. eds., 1997) (containing an excellent set of national
receptions studies focusing on courts and to some extent on legal culture); STONE
SWEET, supra note 17.
23. See Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, The European Court and the
National Courts: A Statistical Analysis of Preliminary Reference, 1961−95, 5 J.
EUR. PUB. POL’Y 66, 72 (1998) [hereinafter Stone Sweet & Brunell, The European
Court and the National Courts] (arguing that, as the “ECJ’s rulings stabilize
expectations about the meaning of EC law,” barriers to international trade will
break down).
24. See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas Brunell, Constructing a
Supranational Constitution, in THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 45, 49
(2004) [hereinafter Stone Sweet & Brunell, Constructing a Supranational
Constitution] (remarking that negative integration driven by the proposed Common
Market created voids for European Community laws to fill); see also Marlene
Wind et al., The Uneven Legal Push for Europe: Questioning Variation When
National Courts Go to Europe, 10 EUR. UNION POL. 63 (2009) (providing a
discussion and critique of Stone Sweet’s work on preliminary references).
25. See ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, supra note
17, at 1 (noting that prior work did not address why ECJ case law was accepted).
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courts to bow to the new realities of the European Union.26 While the
new political literature brought about crucial new insights, it was still
written within the constitutional paradigm developed by Stein and
Weiler. As a consequence, the core narrative remained a progressive
story of successful constitutionalization.
Ironically, considering the emergence of the new political science
literature, the legal scholars of the field had already begun by the
mid-1990s to reconsider the constitutional paradigm, if not the core
historical narrative underlying it. This major change of perspective
was prompted partly by the design of the Maastricht Treaty, which
kept the ECJ out of two of the three pillars, and by the famous
Maastricht judgment27 of the German Constitutional Court. In the
latter, the German Supreme Court may have accepted the
enforcement system of European law de facto, but it seriously
questioned the autonomy and constitutional nature of European
law.28 European public law, it was argued, was the result of
delegation from the national level and in this sense subordinated to
national constitutions and their guardians—the national supreme
courts.29 This reminder of persistent national resistance to the
European constitutional practice caused a serious reassessment
among EU law scholars of the nature of European law. Wanting for
ideological reasons to stick with the constitutional denominator,
scholars continued to develop European constitutionalism.30 A host
of new theories and conceptualizations emerged, among these
attempts to provide the European constitutional legal order with a

26. See id. at 38 (explaining that national courts accepted the supremacy of
European law because “a compromise is better than legal anarchy”). See generally
KAREN ALTER, THE EUROPEAN COURT’S POLITICAL POWER (2009) (containing a
number of articles in which Alter reflects on her earlier research).
27. Bundesverfassungsgericht [Bverfg] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12,
1993, BverfGE 155, 1992 (Ger.).
28. See PETER LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING EUROPE
AND THE NATION-STATE 183–87 (2010) (noting how the decision questioned a
number of factors including the “EU’s lack of autonomous democratic
legitimacy”).
29. Cf. id. at 166–89 (providing a fresh perspective on the Maastricht
judgment).
30. See generally Matej Avbelj, Questioning EU Constitutionalisms, 9
GERMAN L.J. 1 (2008) (analyzing the diversification of European constitutional
theory from the 1990s onwards).
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stronger normative dimension,31 accepting constitutional pluralism,
and portraying contention as deliberation32 or reconceptualizing
European constitutionalism as a new legal form beyond the
Westphalian paradigm of national sovereignty.33
The apparent crisis of the constitutional paradigm became full
blown when recently a number of different studies began to question
its core assumptions as well as key empirical conclusions. American
political scientist Lisa Conant questioned the notion that national
judiciaries and member states had accepted the new European rule of
law by documenting the extent to which they “contained justice.”34
American legal scholar Peter Lindseth found that European
constitutionalism, both in the shape of ECJ case law as well as
academic analysis, represented a detour from the deeper and more
legitimate legal roots of European integration that he argued instead
rested on administrative delegation from national institutions.35
Finally, a new Bourdieu-based sociological literature emerged,
exploring for the first time systematically the role of jurists in the
European construction.36 Scholars such as Mikael Rask Madsen and
Antoine Vauchez argued that European constitutionalism, including
the academic variant, merely constituted an attempt of selfempowerment of jurists and in fact was no more than an ordinary
31. See, e.g., Joseph Weiler, The Reformation of European Constitutionalism,
35 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 97 (1997) (noting that a normative discussion is a
“hallmark” of the reformed discussion of constitutionalism).
32. See, e.g., Mattias Kumm, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict:
Constitutional Supremacy in Europe Before and After the Constitutional Treaty, 11
EUR. L.J. 262 (2005) (asserting that, in European law, the particular type of
pluralism is one that can “avoid conflict in practice”).
33. See, e.g., Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L.
REV. 317 (2002) (“Constitutional pluralism recognises that in the post-Westphalian
world there exists a range of different constitutional sites and processes configured
in a heterarchical rather than a hierarchical pattern . . . .”).
34. See LISA CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 3 (2002) (defining “contained justice” as the phenomenon in
which EU member states obey particular judgments of the European Court of
Justice while simultaneously ignoring the judgments’ greater implications).
35. See LINDSETH, supra note 28, at 168–69 (asserting that the most important
aspect of the Maastricht ruling was the parliament’s delegation of power to
Community institutions).
36. See generally SCHEINGOLD, THE RULE OF LAW IN EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION, supra note 16 (representing the most important predecessor to also
focus on the role of jurists); Schepel & Wesseling, supra note 4, at 165–88
(providing the first Bourdieu analysis of the role of jurists in the European Union).
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process of juridification.37
The new historical analyses of the roots and nature of European
public law are part of this last wave of critical studies.38 Historians
are latecomers to the field and are undoubtedly inspired by
theoretical elements in existing explanations. Nevertheless, it is
important to point out that the methodology of the discipline of
history is fundamentally different from either law or the social
sciences. The focus of historians is less to promote an explicit
theoretical approach. Rather, it is to identify the best possible
documentary and oral evidence to analyze the historical processes
that shaped European public law. Archival sources are crucial
because most of the events that shaped this history actually took
place behind closed doors, in personal networks or at events that
were little covered by contemporary press. The new historical
research has made the first systematic effort to utilize recently
opened archives, track personal archives, and conduct interviews.39
As a result, it offers empirically better-founded narratives about the
social world in which European public law was shaped than most
37. E.g., Niilo Kauppi & Mikael Rask Madsen, Institutions et Acteurs:
Rationalité, Réflexivité et Analyse de l'UE, 25 POLITIQUE EUROPÉENNE 87 (2008)
(providing a sociological perspective on the EU as opposed to economics, law, or
political science); Antoine Vauchez, The Force of a Weak Field: Law and Lawyers
in the Government of the European Union (For a Renewed Research Agenda), 2
INT’L POL. SOC. 128 (2008) (considering the socio-historical and sociological
factors that shaped European integration).
38. See
generally
Rasmussen,
Constructing
and
Deconstructing
‘Constitutional’ European Law, supra note 3 (providing a description of a
historical approach to the study of European public law).
39. Recent sociological literature has also employed archives although coupled
with a strong theoretical bend. See, e.g., Julie Bailleux, Comment l’Europe Vint au
Droit: Le Premier Congrès International d’études de la CECA (Milan-Stresa
1957), 60 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 295 (2010); Antonin Cohen,
Constitutionalism Without Constitution: Transnational Elites Between Political
Mobilization and Legal Expertise in the Making of a Constitution for Europe, 32
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 109 (2007) (citing to a number of archival documents to show
that the history of European integration is crucial to understanding issues related to
the sociology of law); Antoine Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of
Judicialization: Van Gend en Loos and the Making of EU Polity, 16 EUR. L.J. 1
(2010) [hereinafter Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of Judicialization]
(arguing “that the debate over the [Van Gend en Loos and Costa] decisions opened
up an opportunity for legal experts and these gentlemen-politicians of law to
reframe EC polity in a manner more suitable to their professional and political
ambitions — that is in judicial terms”).
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legal and social science literature and, in this way, crucially
contributes to attempts of generalization and theory building.40
Although historical inquiry into the foundation and development
of European public law is still in its infancy, it is now possible to
summarize the new insights it offers. As we shall see, the historical
account emerging is a revisionist one that in fundamental ways
changes our understanding of what shaped European public law, who
were the key actors, and how the historical processes under
investigation might be more accurately conceptualized. The next
three sections highlight the contributions of historical research to our
understanding of which actors mattered, how to understand what
historians have termed the constitutional practice in European public
law, and, finally, how the member states of the EU received
European law.

III. WHICH ACTORS SHAPED
EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW?
With regard to identifying which actors mattered to the
development of European public law, historical research confirms
but also deepens recent trends. The tendency in existing literature has
been to go from focusing mainly on courts—the ECJ and national
courts—to increasingly include new categories of actors in the
analysis. In his famous 1981 article, Stein added the legal advisors of
the Commission, the Council, and the member states, as well as EU
academia to the field.41 Alter and Stone Sweet later added the private
litigants to the mix as well.42 Lately, research by scholars such as
Lisa Conant has explored how various social actors such as trade
unions, women’s movements, and environmental movements can be
40. See THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: ORIGINS OF A TRANS- AND
SUPRANATIONAL POLITY 1950−72 6–8 (Wolfram Kaiser et al. eds., 2009)
(providing a more general discussion of the use of historical methodology in
European studies).
41. See Stein, supra note 1 (looking at eleven different cases and categorically
analyzing the roles that various actors played in the constitutional issues).
42. See Stone Sweet & Brunell, The European Court and the National Courts,
supra note 23, at 66–97 (recognizing that legal integration involves “intimate
connections” between private litigants, national judiciaries, and the ECJ); see also
ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, supra note 17,
preface (noting that allowing private litigants to bring cases to the ECJ
distinguishes the EU legal system from other international legal systems).
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crucial in politicizing ECJ case law against recalcitrant national
courts, administrations, and governments.43 Finally, Bourdieuinspired sociologists have focused on jurists as a particular social
group of professionals, with their own distinctive habitus and
interests.44
Historical research confirms the importance of the various actors
already investigated by existing research, but it also adds several new
types of actors, which have been relatively overlooked until now. At
the European level, historical research, as well as the Bourdieuinspired sociological studies mentioned above, has made significant
strides in understanding how transnational networks of professional
jurists and academics in and around the Fédération Internationale
pour le droit Europèen (“FIDE”) promoted and legitimized ECJ case
law and the constitutional practice from the early 1960s onwards.45 It
has clearly demonstrated how the academic discipline of EU law
played a key role in the history of European public law. Finally, the
role of the legal committee of the European Parliament has until
recently remained unexplored, but it was clearly an important part of
43. CONANT, supra note 34.
44. See Antoine Vauchez, How to Become a Transnational Elite: Lawyers’
Politics at the Genesis of the European Communities (1950−1970), in PARADOXES
OF EUROPEAN LEGAL INTEGRATION 129 (Hanne Paterson et al. eds., 2008)
(providing the most accessible presentation of this theory).
45. See Karen Alter, Jurist Advocacy Movements in Europe: The Role of Eurolaw Associations in European Integration, in THE EUROPEAN COURT’S POLITICAL
POWER, supra note 27, at 63 [hereinafter Alter, Jurist Advocacy Movements in
Europe] (discussing how various parties and individuals worked to promote legal
integration and Euro-law); Antoine Vauchez, The Making of the European Union’s
Constitutional Foundations: The Brokering Role of Legal Entrepreneurs and
Networks, in TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION:
GOVERNING EUROPE 1945−83 108 (Wolfram Kaiser et al. eds., 2010) (describing a
1964 case where two FIDE members made bold assertions in support of
integration); Morten Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practise: The Role
of the European Law Associations, in SOCIETAL ACTORS IN EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION: POLITY-BUILDING AND POLICY-MAKING 1958−1992 173 (Wolfram
Kaiser & Jan-Henrik Meyer eds., 2013) [hereinafter Rasmussen, The Role of the
European Law Associations] (suggesting that the importance of FIDE in
establishing an understanding of the rising constitutionalization has been
overstated yet should still be recognized as a relevant factor); Alexandre Bernier,
Constructing and Legitimating: Transnational Jurist Networks and the Making of
a Constitutional Practice of European Law, 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 399, 406
(2012) (listing the important benefits FIDE had in the development of European
Law).
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the coordinated attempt by European institutions to support and
legitimize the ECJ’s constitutional practice.46
At the national level, historical research suggests that we have to
go beyond the classical legal advisors in the foreign ministries.47
European public law mattered and was followed by several
ministries from the very outset. Officials both in the Ministries of
Justice and Foreign Affairs played an important role in how
European law was perceived and received by each member state.
Taking a look at the archives of national ministries one can often
follow a systematic and sophisticated debate about European case
law.48 At times national administrations attempted to control the
process of reception, as in the case of Denmark, where the Ministry
of Justice informally coordinated a response with the judiciary and
directly controlled how many (that is, very few) and which
preliminary references Danish courts would send to the ECJ.49 In
addition, the battle over the status of European law among national
law academics seriously delayed the establishment of genuine study
programs of European public law at the Law Faculties of the member
states.50 We consequently need a very broad analysis of the formation
of an independent academic field of EU law to properly understand
how European public law was received and shaped by legal
academia.51 Finally, there are reasons to believe that the general
46. See generally Guillaume Sacriste, L’Europe est-elle un État comme les
Autres? Retour sur la Distinction Public/privé au Sein de la Commission Juridique
du Parlement Européen des Années 1960, 2012 CULTURES & CONFLICTS 35 (2012)
(providing a sociological study of the legal committee of the European
Parliament). A new historical study by Ann-Christina Lauring Knudsen is
currently being conducted in the framework of a new collective research project,
“Towards a New History of European Public Law,” directed by the present author
(http://europeanlaw.saxo.ku.dk).
47. Cf. Stein, supra note 1, at 1–2 (listing lawyers in foreign ministries as a
“dominant group” in the European judicial process).
48. For examples, consult the collections of the French archives of the Ministry
of Justice (Archive Nationales, Fontainebleau) or the Foreign Ministry (La
Courneuve).
49. Peter Pagh, Præjudicelle forelæggelser og Juridisk Specialudvalg, 41
UGESKRIFT FOR RETSVÆSEN 305 (2004).
50. For initial analysis of how FIDE did not very successfully affect the
member states, see Bernier, supra note 45, and Rasmussen, The Role of the
European Law Associations, supra note 45.
51. A successful attempt to do this with the German cases has recently been
published. See ANNA KATHARINA MANGOLD, GEMEINSCHAFTRECHT UND
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public opinion, shaped by newspaper and media coverage,
occasionally played an important role in defining the stance of
national courts in key judgments of ECJ case law, such as recently
demonstrated with regard to the famous German Constitutional Court
Solange judgment from 1974.52
Historical research finally provides us with a better understanding
of the precise roles of the different actors. Focusing until now in
particular on the first three decades of European public law,
historical research has been able to document how some of the most
crucial developments took place outside the courtrooms of the ECJ
and national courts. One example is the constitutional reforms of the
Netherlands in 1953 and 1956 that introduced the concept of
international law supremacy in the Dutch legal order and as a
consequence set the scene for the establishment of a constitutional
practice in European public law in 1963 and 1964.53 These reforms
were part of a broad legal and political battle in the Netherlands over
the role of international law in the country but also concerned the
role of the executive and national parliaments vis-à-vis the judiciary
in a country, where constitutional review was considered illegal.54
Another example is the role played by the Legal Service of the High
Authority/European Commission in developing and promoting the
constitutional practice in European public law.55 A further example
DEUTCHES RECHT. DIE
HISTORISH-EMPIRISCHER

EUROPÄISIERUNG DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSORDNUNG IN
SICHT (2011). A general study of the constitutional
practice in EU law academia will be undertaken in the next three years by doctoral
student Rebekka Byberg at the University of Copenhagen in the framework of the
“Towards a New History of European Public Law” project at University of
Copenhagen. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
52. DAVIES, supra note 3.
53. Karin Van Leeuwen, On Democratic Concerns and Legal Traditions: The
Dutch 1953 and 1956 Constitutional Reforms ‘Towards’ Europe, 21 CONTEMP.
EUR. HIST. (Special Issue No. 3) 357 (2012) (analyzing the Dutch constitutional
reforms in the early 1950s to offer a different view about the nature of the
development of European law) (explaining that the Dutch reforms not only defined
the conditions of Dutch membership in supranational organizations but also
introduced the idea that international law should have priority over conflicting
national legislation).
54. Id. (2012) (analyzing the Dutch constitutional reforms in the early 1950s to
offer a different view about the nature of the development of European law).
55. Morten Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European
Law: The History of the Legal Service of the European Executive, 1952–65 21
CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. (Special Issue No. 3) 375, 381 (2012) [hereinafter
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and completely unknown until recently is the extent to which the
German administration and government at the highest level were part
of handling the fallout to the German Constitutional Court’s Solange
decision.56
To conclude, recent historical research suggests that we need a
very broad understanding of the actors and societal forces that
shaped the development of European public law, but it also provides
precise evidence pertaining to which exact actor influenced key
events and processes in European public law.

IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE OF
EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW—
THE TRANSNATIONAL LEVEL
One of the most important contributions provided by the new
historical research concerns perhaps the most important set of
questions in the history of European public law: how and why a
constitutional practice was established and to what extent national
governments, administrations, and courts accepted it. According to
the classic, mainstream narrative, discussed in the first section, the
key actor was the ECJ. Through its case law, the court built a
constitutionalized, proto-federal legal order for Europe.57 The ECJ
successfully managed to persuade national courts to act as European
courts, so by the early 1990s a genuine federalized rule of law
existed in the new European Union.
Historical research cannot yet give us the full picture of how the
constitutional practice of European public law developed from the
mid-1950s to the present day. However, even if only offering a
partial account, recent historical analyses add both new important
empirical details as well as what amounts to a revisionist
interpretation of the nature of the constitutional practice. In this
section, we shall focus on the processes taking place at the European

Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law] (noting the
hesitance of most European legal scholars at the time to view the developing law
through a constitutional lens).
56. DAVIES, supra note 3.
57. Cf. KELEMEN, supra note 17, at 4–6 (addressing how the link between the
ECJ and national courts was not intentional, leading one to question whether
member state control really exists).
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level, in the supranational institutions and various transnational
networks, where the constitutional practice arguably originated. In
the next section, we shall explore how the politics and law of the
member states provided a constitutive frame for the development of
European public law, while at the same time a variety of national
actors resisted and undermined the constitutional practice.
With regard to the establishment of the constitutional practice,
recent historical research has given us a much clearer understanding
of what drove the process.58 The constitutional vision of European
law had its roots in the various movements for European unity in the
immediate post-war period favoring a federal model for European
reconstruction that would fundamentally break with what was
perceived as the dangerous nationalist past of the continent.59
National governments never fully adopted the federal visions.60 Plans
for a federal union in the framework of the Council of Europe in the
late 1940s and plans for the European Defence Community and a
European Political Community in the early 1950s all faltered.
However, the notion that European integration ought to be based on a
foundation of constitutional law and include a European supreme
court was present in influential political and legal circles.61
The European treaties that founded the ECSC in 1951 and the
EEC/Euratom in 1957 were formally of international law and
controlled by the contracting parties. They included classical features
of international law, most strikingly in the EEC Treaty, according to
which national courts were given exclusive competence to apply
European law in the national legal orders.62 The EEC Treaty, which
58. See generally 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. (Special Issue No. 3) (2012).
59. See Cohen, supra note 39, at 113–20.
60. See id. at 109–35 (arguing that federalism emerged as a tool to encourage
European unity following World War II but was not fully implemented by the
different European states).
61. See id. at 115–23 (suggesting that the idea of a European Constitution drew
the attention of important law professors and practitioners); Morten Rasmussen,
The Origins of a Legal Revolution – The Early History of the European Court of
Justice, 14 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. 77, 80–81 (2008) (discussing that, in the
early 1950s, influential political groups took the initiative to draft a constitution for
the European Political Community and to institute a European supreme court based
on the U.S. Supreme Court).
62. See, e.g., Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 215 (stating that the legal
principles common to the laws of the European member states shall apply in cases
of non-contractual liability).
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would be the central foundational document after 1958, essentially
created a Community in which member state governments (together)
would legislate and where national administrations and courts would
respectively implement and apply European law in the member
states. The Commission merely took the initiative to legislative acts,
performed a monitoring task whether member states fulfilled their
obligations (aided by the relatively weak infringement procedure
before the ECJ outlined in article 169), and to some extent and at a
general level advised how national administrations would apply
European law. Considering that the purpose of the EEC was to set up
a common market of major importance to the social and economic
stability of the member states, it is understandable that governments
created a Community system in which national states both at the
political and administrative level were deeply involved in European
policy making. What was designed was not a federal polity, despite
the existence of a seemingly proto-federal institutional structure
including a court and an assembly, but rather a system in which
national governments attempted to control the decision-making,
application, and administration of European public policies.63 The
rise of the Council of Minister’s Permanent Representatives
(“COREPER”) and their sub-committees, and consequently the
extension of national administrations into a European administrative
space in the 1960s, can be seen as an expression of the same trend.64
The regulatory nature of European integration was clearly an
extension of what Peter Lindseth has termed the post-war
administrative state into a new European space.65
However, despite the general design of the EEC Treaty and the
deeper trends involved in the transformation of the post-war
63. See generally ANDRE M. DONNER, THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1968) (providing a nuanced legal assessment of the
ways national powers were completely intertwined with all dimensions of the
Community and rejecting the notion that European law could be autonomous).
Because the EEC did not have two separate levels of policy making or
administration, a federal legal order would not correspond to the actual social,
administrative, and political practice.
64. See generally Ann-Christina L. Knudsen & Morten Rasmussen, A
European Political System in the Making 1958−1970: The Relevance of Emerging
Committee Structures, 14 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. 51 (2008) (discussing, inter
alia, the background of COREPER and its role in the origins of the European
system).
65. LINDSETH, supra note 28, at 180–87.
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European states to cope with the regulatory demands of welfare
states and modern economies, discrete federalist elements were at the
same time inserted in the legal fabric of the treaties. The federalist
vision was first promoted by the German delegation in 1951 in the
Treaty of Paris and later by a committee of legal experts in the EEC
Treaty in 1957.66 Among the constitutional or federalist elements
were the core objective of the Court to uphold the law, implying that
a European rule of law, or in German “Rechtgemeinschaft,” should
be developed (article 164 in the EEC Treaty), and also the
mechanism of preliminary reference, which would eventually play an
instrumental role in allowing the ECJ to develop its case law (article
177 in the EEC Treaty).67
Most national administrations believed they were dealing with
ordinary international treaties, but in the High Authority of the ECSC
and later the European Commission, the Legal Service and its
director Michel Gaudet had a different idea. Inspired by federal
ideas, Gaudet believed that the ECJ should not interpret the letter of
the law, protecting the sovereignty of the contracting parties, as was
supposedly the tradition under international law.68 Instead, the court
should focus on the federal objectives of the treaties and, by means
of a teleological method, develop the competences of the
Communities in order to allow the High Authority or the
Commission to conduct the necessary policies to achieve the
objectives of the treaties.69 The belief that the legal nature of the
ECSC and the EEC went beyond international law was rejected not
66. Anne Boerger-De Smedt, La Cour de Justice dans les Négociations du
Traité de Paris Instituant la CECA, 14 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HISTORY 7, 28–29
(2008) [hereinafter Boerger-De Smedt, La Cour de Justice].
67. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, arts. 164, 177 (stating that the Court
shall ensure that the Treaty be applied in accordance with the law and that it has
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings); Boerger-De Smedt, La Cour de Justice,
supra note 66 (stating that, during the Treaty of Rome negotiations, the jurists—in
particular, the German ones—emphasized the importance of developing a uniform
European jurisprudence in which the ECJ would act as the main judicial body with
regards to the interpretation of the Treaty); Anne Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating
the Foundations of European Law, 1950–57: The Legal History of the Treaties of
Paris and Rome, 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 339 (Special Issue No. 3) (2012)
[hereinafter Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations of European Law].
68. Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law, supra
note 55.
69. Id.
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only in national legal debates, such as at the most famous venue of
German public law, the Deutsche Staatsrechtslehrer congresses in
1953 and 1959,70 but also by scholars of international law who
considered the ECSC merely a subset of international law.71 Finally,
before 1958 the ECJ did not follow the lead of the Legal Service and
generally abstained from entering too much into doctrinal territory in
its case law, probably due to the composition of the judges on the
bench.72
This changed with the foundation of the EEC in 1958. Because the
legal tools of the EEC treaty were modest and could be construed as
insufficient to match the grand objective of creating a full common
market, the Legal Service’s teleological argument made much better
sense than it had with regard to the ECSC. After all, a common
market was of great future importance to the societies of the member
states, matching much better the implicit federalist assumptions
underlying the teleological method of interpretation. In contrast, the
ECSC had, after the fall of the EDC/EPC in July 1954, merely
constituted a narrow coal and steel community with a doubtful
political future. Then it mattered less that the purpose of the design
of the EEC Treaty had been exactly to keep the political and
administrative control in the hands of national institutions.
Several factors contributed to what amounted to a general
breakthrough for the legal philosophy of the Legal Service in the first
half of the 1960s. Firstly, the constitutional reforms of the
Netherlands in 1953 and 1956 introduced the notion that
70. Begriff und Wesen des sozialen Rechtsstaates. Die auswärtige Gewalt der
Bundesrepublik Berichte und Aussprache zu den Berichten in den Verhandlungen
der Tagung der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer zu Bonn am 15. und
16. Oktober 1953 (Nachdr. d. Ausg. 1954); Das Grundgesetz und die öffentliche
Gewalt internationaler Staatsgemeinschaften. Der Plan als verwaltungsrechtliches
Institut
Verhandlungen der Tagung der Vereinigung der Deutschen
Staatsrechtslehrer zu Erlangen vom 7. bis 9. Oktober 1959 (Nachdr. d. Ausg.
1960), 1968. See DAVIES, supra note 3 (discussing the importance and
implications of these debates for the German reception).
71. See, e.g., Eugenio Greppi, A propos du caractère supranational de la
C.E.C.A.: Récentes contributions scientifiques, Les cahiers du Bruges, Recherches
européennes, 1956, Quaterly I, 25−39; Bailleux, supra note 39 (asserting that the
ECSC is governed by supranational principles of law).
72. Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law, supra
note 55 (noting the change in the composition of the ECJ in 1958 and a move
toward constitutional interpretation of European law).
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international law was supreme vis-à-vis national law if it was
“binding on anyone” or, with a somewhat ambiguous expression,
self-executing.73 Decided by parliament, at first in opposition to the
Dutch government in 1952, these reforms were explicitly referring to
the new system of European public law as a justification of the new
far-reaching clause, which were unique in international law.74 With
the introduction of the system of preliminary references in the EEC
Treaty, Dutch lawyers—organized by the Dutch association of
European law—saw an opportunity to strengthen enforcement of
European law in the Netherlands and throughout the EC. The
question was to what extent European public law, including the
treaties, was “self-executing.”75 Such clauses would automatically be
attributed supremacy in the Dutch constitutional context but would
also most likely force a position either in the other member states or
in Luxembourg on the question of European law supremacy. Dutch
courts raised this question several times and in general drove the
development of the mechanism of preliminary references in the first
half of the 1960s, sending fifteen out of the first eighteen cases.76
Secondly, European law movements in the member states were
established. The French Association des Juristes Européens was the
first in 1954 and was followed between 1958 and 1961 by similar
associations in the other member states. In 1961 an umbrella
organization, the FIDE, was founded.77 The European law
associations provided a crucial link between the emerging academic
and professional field of EU law and the European institutions and
would play an important role in legitimating and promoting the ECJ
doctrines to national governments, administrations, judiciaries, firms,
and legal academics. Moreover, they occasionally mobilized

73. Id.
74. Van Leeuwen, supra note 53.
75. See Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law,
supra note 55 (noting the debate over whether article 12 of the EEC Treaty was
self-executing and to what extent it created “rights for citizens applicable before
national courts”).
76. Id.
77. See FIDE, FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE POUR LE DROIT EUROPÉEN,
http://www.fide2012.eu/FIDE/id/81/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (stating that FIDE
is an organization that “focuses on research and analysis of European Union law
and EU institutions, and their interaction with the legal systems of the member
states”).
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important cases through the system of preliminary references, as was
the case in Van Gend en Loos.78 Finally, the balance inside the ECJ
more or less accidentally changed in a pro-federal direction with the
nomination of two new judges, Frenchman Robert Lecourt and
Italian Alberto Trabucchi.79 Taken together, these factors provided
the legal case and changed the attitude of the ECJ to the legal
philosophy of the Legal Service.
As a result, the ECJ in two seminal judgments—Van Gend en
Loos in 196380 and Costa v. E.N.E.L. in 196481—accepted the legal
philosophy of the Legal Service with regard to the enforcement of
European law. European legal norms—even treaty articles—could
have direct effect and supremacy over conflicting national law. The
ECJ made the final call based on preliminary references from
national courts. The reasoning underlying the judgments was
teleological by necessity. The Treaties of Rome did not include
direct effect and supremacy of European law as general principles.82
In fact, not even the legal committee of experts—federally inclined
as they were—had during the negotiations on the EEC Treaty
planned for the mechanism of preliminary reference to become an
alternative enforcement mechanism protecting the individual citizens
against the lack of implementation by the member states’

78. Alter, Jurist Advocacy Movements in Europe, supra note 45, at 69–79; see
Rasmussen, The Role of the European Law Associations, supra note 45, at 173–74
(explaining the importance of legal associations like FIDE in shaping EU law
through their influence with the ECJ); Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of
Judicialization, supra note 39, at 116–18 (describing how FIDE elevated the
importance of Van Gend en Loos prior to the ECJ’s decision).
79. See
generally
Rasmussen,
Constructing
and
Deconstructing
‘Constitutional’ European Law, supra note 3, at 9–15 (discussing the impact that
Lecourt and Trabucchi had on the ECJ).
80. See generally Case C-26/62, Van Gen en Loos v. Administratie der
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
81. See generally Case C-6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 587.
82. See Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law,
supra note 55. Council regulations were directly applicable, but their supremacy
depended on national constitutional requirements at least until the Costa v.
E.N.E.L. judgment. Council directives were framework decisions, which national
administrations could apply independently, choosing the means they saw fit. With
regard to treaty articles, there was seemingly an agreement that articles 85 and 86
of the EEC Treaty had direct effect, even if national case law in 1960 and 1961 did
not agree.
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administrations of their European obligations.83 However, while the
doctrines introduced to strengthen the enforcement of the treaties
may have been controversial and surprising to the member states—
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany, alongside the Court’s own
Advocate General, had opposed the principle of direct effect at the
Van Gend en Loos case—the practical consequences were limited.84
At first, the ECJ cautiously limited the doctrines to treaty articles that
constituted negative obligations, i.e., clauses on member states not to
act, as was the case in Van Gend en Loos, finding that member states
must not increase tariffs in the process of dismantling them (article
12 of the EEC Treaty).85 The ECJ would later first expand the
doctrines to additional treaty articles and eventually in the 1970s also
controversially, and only partly successfully, attempt to declare
certain types of Council directives directly effective.86
From the Van Gend en Loos case onwards, the European
institutions and FIDE mobilized in support of the new revolutionary
ECJ doctrines. Commission President Walter Hallstein already came
out in support of supremacy of European law in a public speech to
the European Parliament before the Costa v. E.N.E.L. judgment had
passed. Likewise, a pamphlet was published in which Hallstein and
former Judge Nicola Catalano explained how European law by
necessity rested on the core principles of direct effect and
supremacy. Following the Costa v. E.N.E.L. judgment, the legal
committee of the European Parliament, guided by Gaudet, authored a

83. See Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations of European Law,
supra note 67, at 353–54. The Groupe de rédation believed the Commission and
national governments would protect individual interests by the means of the
infringement procedure (article 169 for the Commission and article 171 for the
national governments). Id.
84. Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of Judicialization, supra note 39, at
12.
85. Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law, supra
note 55, at 391–94. See generally Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 12 (declaring
that “Member States shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new
customs duties on imports or exports or any charges having equivalent effect”).
86. Francesca Bignami, Conference Report, Biennial Conference of the
European Union Studies Association, Comparative Law and the Rise of the
European Court of Justice (Mar. 3–5, 2011), at 21, available at
http://www.eustudies.org/files/2011%20program%20final.pdf (describing the
reticence of all parties involved to give direct effect to Council directives and the
series of ECJ cases that established the rule).
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report, which endorsed the new doctrines of European law and
recommended that the member states accept the binding nature of
European public law. FIDE likewise endorsed direct effect in a
public statement at the second FIDE congress in The Hague, in
October 1963, and at the national level, seminars and conferences
were organized to explain and promote the new doctrines to national
audiences and legal elites. All in all, quite a massive campaign
endorsing the new doctrines of the ECJ consequently took place in
1964 and 1965.87 To the emerging field of EU law academia, the new
doctrines would define European law as a new legal field separate
from both international law and domestic law and worth studying on
its own terms. EU law was already taught at a few European studies
centers in the six member states. Now an increasing number of
universities began to establish chairs in European law, and a number
of EU law journals were established. The way the constitutional
practice of the ECJ shaped the early academic field of EU law and
the early role of FIDE as advocates of ECJ case law would leave a
strong mark on scholarly analysis.
What drove the establishment of a constitutional practice in
European public law? The new history presented above suggests that
the breakthrough of the constitutional practice was not the result of
functional pressures or the result of a clear legal logic flowing from
the Treaties of Rome. Indeed, the legal and political forces seem
overwhelmingly to have disfavored a constitutional interpretation of
the Treaties of Rome. That it nevertheless happened could be traced
to the combination and contingency of a complex set of factors and
the element of chance. The evidence furthermore brings out just how
important the Legal Service of the High Authority/the Commission
was to the early development of European law and identified the
federalist ideology and institutional interests that motivated the
service. Finally, the story demonstrated how a mobilization of
European institutions and transnational networks attempted to
87. See generally Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of Judicialization, supra
note 39 (explaining in detail that this mobilization in support of the new
revolutionary ECJ doctrines came about after the Van Gend en Loos and Costa
rulings); see also, Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European
Law, supra note 55, at 394–96 (noting that the second and third FIDE conferences
dealt with direct effect and primacy, and thus provided additional support for the
new doctrines).
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legitimize and promote the constitutional practice. The breakthrough
was consequently far from the work alone of the ECJ.
What was the nature of the process? These conclusions suggest
that only a weak coalition of European institutions and
transnationally networked pro-European jurists supported the
constitutional practice. In European venues such as the European
Parliament or at the biannual FIDE congresses, the breakthrough
may have been felt as a momentous development. However, in the
member states, national administrative and legal elites held very
different views on the legal nature of European integration and
generally did not necessarily share the enthusiasm. The constitutional
revolution would have a very limited impact on the member states
before the mid-1980s, as we shall see below.

V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE OF
EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW—THE ROLE OF THE
MEMBER STATES
The reception of European public law in the member states has
until recently been a field dominated by the interpretation offered by
the constitutional paradigm. The assumption has been that member
states progressively accepted European public law and that by the
early 1990s a European rule of law existed.88 This conclusion was
drawn from the relative lack of government action to curb the
influence of the ECJ and was reinforced by analyses of how the
dialogue between national courts and the ECJ developed. By 1991,
national high courts seemingly all had accepted de facto the
constitutional practice.89 However, the design of the Maastricht
Treaty and the German Constitutional Court’s Maastricht judgment
88. See, e.g., ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW,
supra note 17, at 27–33 (explaining the establishment of a European rule of law);
Joseph Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The ECJ and Its Interlocutors, 26 COMP. POL.
STUD. 510, 510–17 (1994) (asserting that certain proponents of this constitutional
paradigm found that the effect of the European constitutional doctrine was to limit
national autonomy by acquiescing to the principles of European public law).
89. See, e.g., Case C-213/89, Regina v. Sec. of State for Transp., 1991 E.C.R.
603 (holding that, in interpreting Community law, a national court must “consider
that the sole obstacle which precludes it from granting interim relief is a rule of
national law must set aside that rule”); see also Raoul Georges Nicolo & Another,
[1990]1 CMLR 173 (Conseil d’Etat, Ass., Oct. 20, 1989) (Council of State,
Assembly) (applying the EEC Treaty to the Republic of France).
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suggested that these conclusions were premature even when only
considering the “high politics” of European public law.90 Recent
research now suggests that in most member states national courts and
administrations did not necessarily apply European law
systematically, and if they did there was no guarantee that they take
the ECJ case law into account.91 No systematic empirical analysis yet
exists of how national courts generally applied European law across
member states. As Michal Bobek has recently argued, we cannot
assume that the silence on the side of national courts necessarily
means that European law is applied in all the relevant cases; rather,
the general evidence suggests that this is not the case.92 Likewise,
recent social science research has uncovered how the administrative
practices of member states often ignored, or even consciously
limited, the legal and practical consequences of ECJ case law.93
Although the historical research on the reception of European law by
the member states is still in its infancy, preliminary results confirm
this more skeptical take on to what extent member states accepted
the constitutional practice of European public law. It should be
pointed out that the new historical literature focuses on the period
before 1986.
The historical analyses of the negotiations of the Treaties of Paris
and Rome have revealed the extent to which most national
governments and diplomats conceived these treaties and the ECJ as

90. See generally Bundesverfassungsgericht [Bverfg] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Oct. 12, 1993, BverfGE 155, 1992 (Ger.) (reiterating that the law of the EU
must be supported by the parliaments and people of the member states).
91. See generally Michal Bobek, Of Feasibility and Silent Elephants:
Legitimacy of the Court of Justice and National Courts, in JUDGING EUROPE’S
JUDGES: THE LEGITIMACY OF CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
EXAMINED (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2129683 (arguing that the
discrepancy between the number of cases involving European law in national
courts and the very low number of preliminary references clearly suggests that
national courts probably disregard or lack knowledge about European law).
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., CONANT, supra note 34, at 3 (noting the role that member states
and administrative practices play in the interpretation of European public law); see
also Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, Judicial Policy-Making and Europeanization: The
Proportionality of National Control and Administrative Discretion, 18 J. EUR.
PUB. POLICY 944 (2011) (pointing out that national executives have numerous
means at their disposal to counter ECJ directives).
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belonging to international law.94 This attitude was clearly reflected in
the way national jurisconsultes defended their governments before
the ECJ in the 1950s and 1960s. Here, national governments
repeatedly objected to the construction of constitutional doctrines,
most famously when Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands
rejected the notion that article 12 (EEC treaty) could create
individual rights for citizens before national courts at the Van Gend
en Loos case.95
When the ECJ carried through its legal revolution with the Van
Gend en Loos and Costa v. E.N.E.L. judgments, considering the
attitude of national governments, administrations, and courts, it
probably wisely chose to limit the concrete effects in terms of
enforcement at first. National governments, administrators, and high
courts immediately took notice when, in 1967, the ECJ stepped up its
game, after changes on the bench had brought in influential federalist
judges such are Pierre Pescatore.96 The ECJ developed European
public law in a number of directions in the 1970s, but it was perhaps
the questions of enforcement and human rights that provoked the
sharpest national responses.97 With regard to the strengthening of
enforcement, the ECJ took the highly controversial step to declare
certain types of directives directly effective. Directives were by
definition of the treaties (article 189)98 and in the member states
believed to be framework decisions that national administrations
would be empowered to implement by means of their own choice. In
particular the British House of Lords and the French Conseil d’État

94. See Boerger-De Smedt, La Cour de Justice, supra note 66 (recognizing an
advancement of European integration through the constitutionalization of the
founding treaties); Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations of European
Law, supra note 67, at 354 (discussing the creation of Community Law, which
functioned like international law).
95. See Stein, supra note 1, at 25 (listing a number of government positions of
key doctrinal cases from 1954 to 1980).
96. See Bill Davies & Morten Rasmussen, From International Law to a
European Rechtsgemeinschaft: Towards a New History of European Law,
1950−1979, PUBLICATIONS EUR. UNION HISTORIANS (forthcoming 2013) (noting
that the new judges provided a generational shift in the judiciary as well as a
doctrinal one).
97. See, e.g., Case C-9/70 Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, 1970 E.C.R. 826. See
generally Bignami, supra note 86 (analyzing Grad in depth).
98. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 189.
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reacted sharply to the ECJ case law.99 In France the national
assembly introduced the so-called Aurillac amendment in 1980,
stating that French courts should not apply European law
independently from the Foreign Ministry.100 Even if the French
Senate did not heed this call, the ECJ had now been warned and
eventually moderated its case law on directives.101 In the field of
human rights, the ECJ case law likewise provoked a most serious
national rebuke. The core pillar of the constitutional practice,
primacy, touched the very core of German identity in post-war
Europe, namely basic rights. What happened to the sacrosanct
catalogue of fundamental human rights if European law trumped the
German constitution in the areas where sovereignty had been
surrendered to the EC? The response of the German Constitutional
Court was not merely a question of kompetenz-kompetenz as it has
often been portrayed; it was a genuine response to serious worries
expressed in the national legal elite and public about the undermining
of basic rights caused by European institutions, which had not yet
reached a genuine democratic stage of development.102
So in the 1970s, the ECJ’s strides of strengthening and deepening
the constitutional practice quickly developed into a conflict of legal
“high politics.” Moreover, the legal “low politics” of how, if at all,
national courts applied the case law of the ECJ or European
legislation in general was far from settled. Unfortunately, neither
law, the social sciences, or history has, until now, systematically
explored to what extent national courts actually applied or continue
to apply European law in the national legal orders. However, recent
historical research on the development of the Common Market from
the 1960s to the mid-1980s implies that national administrations and
courts to a large degree must have sidestepped or ignored European
99. See, e.g., ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW,
supra note 17, at 153 (discussing France’s challenges to the ECJ’s expanding
authority).
100. Id. at 151–57.
101. See Bignami, supra note 86, at 25–26 (noting that the ECJ shifted its
application of direct effect to a “ricochet” theory that made directives only binding
against states and could therefore no longer be used against individuals in court);
see, e.g., Case C-152/84 Marshall v. Southampton & South-West Hampshire Area
Health Auth., 1986 E.C.R. 737 (holding, in part, that a directive “may be relied on
against a State authority acting in its capacity as an employer).
102. DAVIES, supra note 3.
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law. Until the Single European Act (“SEA”) in 1986, member states
continued to conduct what can best be characterized as a policy of
segmented national markets to protect national socio-economic
compromises against the potential negative consequences of
liberalization.103 Efforts by the European institutions to establish the
four freedoms met very serious obstacles and, if at all, occurred at
best in a piecemeal and delayed fashion.104 Legal and social science
research on the role of ECJ case law in the construction of the
Common Market has told a very different story—one where ECJ
doctrines gradually strip away singular and discriminatory
administrative practices of the member states.105 However, the
narrow focus of such research on ECJ case law and the responses
given by governments in the courtroom or collectively in the Council
of Ministers means that the potentially discriminatory practices of
national administrations and courts have not been taken sufficiently
into account. Future research is needed to uncover exactly what role
ECJ case law played in the construction of the Common Market and
the SEA reform and provide us with a better understanding of the
extent to which national administrations and courts actually heeded
to the ECJ’s case law.106 All in all, current historiography at the very
least suggests that national resistance to the constitutional practice of
103. See Introduction to DIRK SPIERENBURG & RAYMOND POIDEVIN, THE
HISTORY OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL
COMMUNITY: SUPRANATIONALITY IN OPERATION (1994), 1, 3–4 (alluding that
socio-economic reasons led to the segmentation of national markets, which in turn
prevented European unity); EUR. COMM’N, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
1958−1972: HISTORY AND MEMORIES (Michael Dumoulin ed., 2007) [hereinafter
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1958-1972: HISTORY AND MEMORIES]; TOBIAS
WITSCHKE, GEFAHR FÜR DEN WETTBEWERB?: DIE FUSIONSKONTROLLE DER
EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT FÜR KOHLE UND STAHL UND DIE
“REKONZENTRATION” DER RUHRSTAHLINDUSTRIE 1950−1963 (2009).
104. See SPIERENBURG & POIDEVIN, supra note 103, at 1–5 (describing the
obstacles created by the national legal orders, which were skeptical about the
process of liberalization and the application of European law); WITSCHKE, supra
note 103; THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1958-1972: HISTORY AND MEMORIES,
supra note 103.
105. See Margaret MacCown, The Free Movement of Goods, in THE JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 109, 109 (2004) (concluding the ECJ imposed its vision
of the Common Market).
106. The role of ECJ case law in the establishment of the Common Market from
1958 to 1986 will be explored by Brigitte Leucht in the framework of the
“Towards a New History of European Public Law” project at University of
Copenhagen, directed by the present author (http://europeanlaw.saxo.ku.dk).
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the ECJ ran much deeper than hitherto assumed. This resistance
continued into the 1980s and possibly beyond.
In addition, the new historical research offers key methodological
insights. The member states did not only act as recipients of
European public law; they were in a number of respects providing
the constitutive frame in terms of legal theory and practice from
which a European public law could develop. This has for some time
been acknowledged in existing research, particularly in the case of
the German Constitutional Court’s Solange jurisprudence, which
deeply influenced ECJ case law.107 Consequently, national judiciaries
have certainly been able to shape the direction of how European
public law developed through the mechanism of preliminary
references, in particular if they embraced the basic tenets of the
constitutional practice.108 What historical research demonstrates is
that national constitutional systems have influenced and framed how
European public law could develop beyond the single responses of
national courts to ECJ case law. Legal culture and practice of the
member states in general have in fundamental ways shaped the
history of European law. Peter Lindseth’s historical analysis of the
negotiations of the Treaties of Paris and Rome is striking because it
demonstrates how intimately connected the various legal tools
chosen for European integration were with the post-war development
of administrative law in the national contexts was with the various
legal tools chosen for European integration.109 Karin van Leeuwen’s
path-breaking analysis of Dutch constitutional reforms similarly
demonstrates just how the way the Dutch constitutional system was
designed to incorporate international law set the scene for the
development of European public law after 1958.110 In fact the very
107. See ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, supra note
17, at 64–123.
108. See generally id. at 33–182 (discussing French and German judicial
acceptance of European law supremacy and how this has shaped the development
of European public law).
109. See LINDSETH, supra note 28, at 91–119 (explaining the connection
between post-war national administrative law and European public law).
110. Van Leeuwen, supra note 54, at 357; see Bruno de Witte & Monica Claes,
Report on the Netherlands, in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS –
DOCTRINES AND JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT 171,
178 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1998) (affirming that the “manner by which
the European Court’s views were formulated may bear the stamp of Dutch
influence”).
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design of the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy by the ECJ
was deeply influenced by the Dutch model, granting only supremacy
to European legal norms that had direct effect, thereby emulating the
Dutch constitutional condition for international law supremacy,
namely that it is “binding on anyone.”111 To conclude, the
constitutive nature of how national constitutional systems and legal
cultures have influenced and shaped European public law constitutes
an exiting new field of research, which certainly will help refine the
general interpretation of the historical development of European
public law.
Finally, there is no doubt that historical analyses of the role of the
member states in the development of European public law have
uncovered a more complex reality than portrayed in existing legal
and social science research. In the first systematic historical study of
member state reception recently published by Bill Davies, it is
demonstrated that the reception of European public law cannot
simply be reduced to concern mainly the relationship between the
ECJ and the German courts.112 From the 1950s onwards, it
systematically involved politicians, a number of ministries, the large
German legal academic elite, and the general public. The
development of a constitutional practice by the European institutions
consequently touched upon not only the competences of national
courts, but also deep-seated political interests, questions of legal
culture, and national identity. Early and partial results from historical
studies of France and the Netherlands confirm the broad implications
of European public law on national life and consequently suggest
that we need to approach the role of the member states with much
more comprehensive studies.113

111. Bignami, supra note 86, at 20–21; see also De Witte & Claes, supra note
110, at 178 (asserting that the “Netherlands have been an important testing-ground
in the course of the 1950s . . . for the principles of direct effect and supremacy as
they were formulated by the European Court in the 1960s”).
112. DAVIES, supra note 3.
113. Doctoral students Alexandre Bernier (University of Copenhagen) and Karin
Van Leeuwen (University of Amsterdam) prepared large case studies on France
and the Netherlands, respectively. Likewise, doctoral student Jonas Pedersen
(Aarhus University) will conduct a case study on Denmark in the next three years.
All projects are part of the “Towards a New History of European Public Law”
project at University of Copenhagen, directed by the present author
(http://europeanlaw.saxo.ku.dk).
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All in all, historical research has begun to demonstrate that the
member states played a more complex role than hitherto assumed, it
has confirmed recent social science and legal research of how
contestation over the constitutional practice seemingly has been a
lasting feature of the history of European public law, and, finally, it
has begun to explore how the national constitutional systems and
legal cultures provided a constitutive framework—a fixed variety of
options—for the development of European public law. Taken
together with the section on how the constitutional practice first
evolved, this section suggests that the classical historical narrative of
the constitutional paradigm needs to be replaced with a new history
of European public law—a history that reveals the deeper legal,
social, and political nature of the constitutional practice and a history
that does not assume that member states progressively accepted the
constitutional practice and a European rule of law.

VI. TOWARD A NEW HISTORY OF EUROPEAN
PUBLIC LAW
Let me finish this article by emphasizing that historical research in
European public law is still very much in its infancy. There are still
many questions and even entire subfields that remain unexplored. In
this sense, this article merely constitutes a preliminary attempt to
offer an assessment of what historians can tell us about the
development and nature of European public law. It is also important
to underline that the arguments presented primarily concern the
history of European law from 1950 to 1986. Let me briefly
summarize the key contributions that current historical writings
offer.
Historical research firmly contextualizes the establishment and
development of European public law in the broader social-economic,
legal, and political development of the member states and European
institutions. Historical analyses have demonstrated that we need to
include a wider range of actors to understand the development of
European public law.114 Focusing merely on the ECJ and national
courts is not enough. Historical analyses have crucially offered a
distinct and revisionist account of both the emergence and
development of the constitutional practice and how that practice was
114. See generally Boerger-De Smedt, La Cour de Justice, supra note 66.
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received by the member states.
The constitutional practice was caused by a combination of
historical factors, most importantly the agency of the Legal Service
of the Commission. It was promoted by a transnational alliance
involving the European institutions and a transnational network of
pro-European jurists. While the constitutional practice shaped the
case law of the ECJ from 1963 onwards, the impact on the member
states was relatively limited. Until the mid-1980s, member states
continued to run the Community largely in the manner they had
intended with the EEC Treaty. Member state control over decisionmaking, administration, and the application of European law were
the prominent features. A key reason for this continued state of
affairs, beyond the initial cautiousness of the ECJ itself before 1967,
was the widespread resistance toward the doctrines of the
constitutional practice from national administrations, courts, and
legal elites in general. Historical research has demonstrated how
complex member state reception of European law actually was. Not
only did it involve a larger number of domestic actors than hitherto
assumed, but member state legal norms and practice also very much
influenced the development of European public law. Member states
thus did not only receive ECJ case law; they also played a
constitutive role for the general development of European public law.
As an overall interpretation of the history of European public law,
focusing on the period from 1950 to the mid-1980s, the new
historical research rejects key assumptions of the constitutional
paradigm, which still holds such a grip on the academic field of EU
law today. It argues that the ECJ did not manage to
“constitutionalize” the Treaties of Rome, even if the discourse in EU
law increasingly claimed this to be the case in the 1980s. Rather, the
court had promoted, together with the Commission and the European
Parliament as well as transnational networks of pro-European jurists,
a constitutional practice in European public law—one the member
states did not, as claimed, progressively accept. Instead, the
constitutional practice was subject to continued contestation and
resistance by important national administrative and legal elites,
which largely contained the impact of ECJ case law in key member
states.
Some might argue, as Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas Brunell have
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done, that contestation and resistance by national administrations and
courts should not surprise us.115 It may be that the European legal
order in terms of administrative implementation and national court
application looks fragmented, but this does not differ very much
from other federal polities such as Canada or the United States.116
The comparison of the European legal order with its North Atlantic
neighbors certainly brings out the federal elements in ECJ case law
and, in this sense, easily lends itself to the conclusion that the
European Union has undergone comparable processes of
constitutionalization and federalization.117
I think this conclusion is premature until we have a much more
detailed history of what factors and processes actually shaped the
history of European law. While the argument can certainly be made
that ECJ case law contains important federal doctrines,118 it does not
follow that the administrative practices nor the role of law in the
European Communities/European Union have been of a federal
115. See generally Stone Sweet & Brunell, Constructing a Supranational
Constitution, supra note 24.
116. Id. at 100.
117. See David M. Trubek, Consumer Law, Common Markets and Federalism:
Introduction and General Concepts, in 3 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE
AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, 14, 14–26 (Mauro Cappelletti et al.
eds., 1987) (comparing consumer protection measures taken in the U.S. federal
system and the European Community); Boerger-De Smedt & Rasmussen, supra
note 11, at 9–10 (outlining the process Stein undertook to establish his comparative
study of European and American law). Compare Vincent Blasi, Constitutional
Limitations on the Power of States to Regulate the Movement of Goods in
Interstate Commerce, in 1 COURTS AND FREE MARKETS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 174 (Terrance Sandalow & Eric Stein eds., 1982)
(discussing constitutionalization of the United States in the context of interstate
commerce), with Henry G. Schermers, The Role of the European Court of Justice
in the Free Movement of Goods, in 1 COURTS AND FREE MARKETS: PERSPECTIVES
FROM THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, supra, at 222 (analyzing the federalization
of the European Union “with respect to freedom of movement of goods”). The
normative implication of making the comparison must have been obvious to the
authors. We know it was to Eric Stein, who organized the Bellagio conference of
1977, which brought together the authors of the first book mentioned.
118. See Giuseppe Martinico, Reading the Others: American Legal Scholars and
the Unfolding European Integration, 11 EUR. J.L. REFORM 35, 35–50 (2009)
(indicating that the federal principles that the ECJ employs are inspired by U.S.
legal scholars). But see T. Sandalow & E. Stein, On the Two Systems: An
Overview, in 1 COURTS AND FREE MARKETS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE UNITED
STATES AND EUROPE, 9–15 (arguing that the U.S. federal experience did not
influence the ECJ).
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nature. Indeed, future research will determine whether ECJ case law
constituted a high-profile and successful attempt to federalize and
constitutionalize the European Union, or whether the court has
largely failed in its endeavor. The concepts such as European
constitution and “constitutionalization” were always deeply
normative attempts to legitimize and strengthen the case law of the
ECJ. We need to reopen the history of European public law by
leaving behind the notion that it has developed or necessarily will
develop into a European constitution. Only by doing this will we be
able to discern the extent to which the constitutional practice was
contested and even more crucially empirically trace the way
European public law was actually practiced in the Community/Union
and the member states. This critique applies just as well to current
attempts to save the concept of constitution in relation to European
public law. Note that such an understanding of the history of
European public law does not deny that the ECJ did indeed promote
a constitutional practice or that such a practice permeated ECJ case
law and EU law academically. Also, it does not imply a rejection of
the notion that the ECJ might to some extent successfully manage to
strengthen the federal traits of the European institutions through its
case law. Nor does it exclude the possibility that the European
electorate will eventually pass a European constitution by
referendum.
What it does is replace normative attempts to legitimize the ECJ
through the constitutional claim with a more accurate understanding
of the driving forces behind the development of European public
law. Only by critically and accurately understanding its own history
can the EU today begin to address the persistent crisis of legitimacy
that haunts it and seriously jeopardizes current attempts to save the
euro and, with it, the Single European Market and the union itself.

